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STUDENT NOTE
PARENTAL JIBa=rt STATUTE
At common law parental relationship is not, of itself, a basis for
holding a parent liable for his child's tortious acts.1 Unless some
other relationship2 can be established or the parent's own negli-
gence3 is found to be the proximate cause of the injury, the child
bears sole responsibility for his tortious acts. Dissatisfaction with
this common law rule, which often leaves the injured party with a
worthless action against an insolvent minor, has been manifested
by the court's circumvention of the rule through dubiously founded
agency relationships4 and through strained applications of the "fore-
seeability" rule s in order to find that some negligent act on the
parent's part is the proximate cause of the injury.
1 Mazzocchi v. Seay, 126 W. Va. 490, 29 S.E.2d 12 (1944); Sibes v.
Johnson, 16 Mass. 388 (1820); Scott v. Watson, 46 Me. 363 (1859).
2 Condel v. Savo, 350 Pa. 350, 39 A.2d 51 (1944); Smith v. Jordon, 211
Mass. 269, 97 N.E. 761 (1912); Hower v. Ulrich, 156 Pa. 410, 27 Atl. 37
(1893).
a Mazzocchi v. Seay, 126 W. Va. 490, 29 S.E.2d 12 (1944); Dickens v.
Barnham, 69 Colo. 349, 194 Pac. 356 (1920); Meers v. McDowell, 110 Ky.
926, 62 S.W. 1013 (1901).4 Wyant v. Phillips, 116 W. Va. 207, 179 S.E. 303 (1935); Watson v.
Burley, 105 W. Va. 416, 143 S.E. 95 (1928); Jones v. Cook, 90 W. Va. 710,
111 S.E. 828 (1922).
5 See Kuchlik v. Feuer, 267 N.Y. Supp. 256, 191 N.E. 555 (1933);
Gudziewski v. Stemplesky, 263 Mass. 103, 160 N.E. 334 (1928); but see
Mazzocchi v. Seay, 126 W. Va. 490, 29 S.E.2d 12 (1944).
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As a result of this judicially expressed dissatisfaction, which
in reality is an expression of the thoughts of modern society, and
as a result of the increased incidents of juvenile vandalism, the
legislature of West Virginia, following the lead of several other
states,6 has enacted a parental liability statute.7
Under West Virginia's parental liability statutes liability is
limited (1) to the parent or parents, (2) in an amount not to exceed
three hundred dollars, (3) of a child under eighteen years of age
(4) who is living with the parent or parents (5) at the time he
commits a wilful and malicious act (6) which results in property
damage. The injured party is provided this statutory remedy (7)
as an addition to and not exclusive of any common law or other
statutory remedy or right of action against a parent for his child's
tortious acts, and (8) may maintain this action in the justice of the
peace court or other courts of competent jurisdiction.
It appears that the legislature anticipated that the principal
statute, being in derogation of the common law, would present the
court with a problem of determining the legislative intent; for a
lengthy preface stating the legislative intent has been incorporated
and enacted as part of the statute.9 The following discussion is
presented to point out that this attempt at clarification by the legis-
lature fails to answer, and perhaps further beclouds, the many
problems raised by the principal statute.
Two rules of statutory construction should be kept in mind
throughout the following discussion: (1) a statute in derogation
of the common law will be strictly construed;' 0 and (2) a statute
must be construed to effectuate the legislative intent."
The statement of legislative intent does not clearly state upon
what basis the parent's liability is founded. In the statement of
legislative intent it is recognized that it is the responsibility of the
6Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana,
Louisiana, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas.
7W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 7A, § § 1, 2 (Michie 1955).
8 Ibid.
9 Id. c. 55, art. 7A, § 1.
10 State ex rel. Ballard v. Vest, 136 W. Va. 80, 65 S.E.2d 649 (1951);
Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W. Va. 774, 200 S.E. 754 (1938); Rhodes v.
J. B. B. Coal Co., 79 W. Va. 71, 90 S.E. 796 (1916); State ex rel. Keller v.
Brymies, 65 W. Va. 451, 64 S.E. 728 (1909).
"1Vest v. Cobb, 138 W. Va. 660, 76 S.E.2d 885 (1953); State ex rel.
Holbert v. Robinson, 184 W. Va. 524, 59 S.E.2d 884 (1950); McVey v.
Crawford, 83 W. Va. 556, 98 S.E. 615 (1919).
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parent to effect the training and discipline of his children; that many
parents have failed in this respect; that as a result of this parental
negligence much of the vandalism has occurred; that because of
this failure of parental responsibility (negligence?) parents should
be liable.
It appears that liability is imposed upon the parent by virtue
of his failure to recognize his parental responsibilities. This lack of
recognition is termed negligence. Therefore, in order to maintain
an action under the principal statute, is it necessary to show that
one was negligent in carrying out his parental responsibilities; i.e.,
that one was negligent in effecting the proper training and discip-
line of his children?
From a practical standpoint the difficulty of proving, for lack
of any certain standard, that a parent was negligent in rearing his
child would practically render the statute nugatory. From the stand-
point of natural justice it would not seem fair to impose liability
upon one who has conscientiously performed his parental duties,
and through no fault of his own has a child who has no respect for
the property rights of others.
The term "parent" as commonly understood means natural
mother and father, but in legal understanding the term may include
one who has adopted a child or one who stands in loco parentis to
a child.' 2 One who adopts a child is entitled to every legal right as
if such child were born to him in lawful wedlock.' 3 One who stands
in loco parentis to a child places himself in the situation of a lawful
parent without going through the formalities of adoption.14 In that
the principal statute requires that the child be living with the parent
at the time he commits the act of vandalism, it appears that control
of the child is an essential prerequisite to the parent's liability. One
who has adopted or stands in loco parentis to a child would be in
a position to exert the requisite control and it would seem that the
term "parent", as used in the principal statute, would logically in-
clude one who has placed himself in either of these positions.
As stated above, control of the child seems to be an essential
prerequisite to the parent's liability under the principal statute.
12See Woans AND PmtASEs, Parent (1957); BLACK, LAW DICTIONAnY
(4th ed. 1951).
13 W.VA. CODE C. 48, art. 4, § 5 (Michie 1955).
14Lewis v. United States, 105 F. Supp. 73 (N.D.W. Va. 1952); Richards
v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 208 (N.D.W. Va. 1950).
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This requirement would relieve the parent of liability for the acts
of his children who no longer reside in his household. In a strict
sense, a child who is away at school or at camp is not living with
his parents; for the parent in this instance has no more physical
control over the child than he has over the child who has perma-
nently ceased to reside in his household. However, a child who is
only temporarily absent from his parent's home is likely to be de-
pendent upon his parent for his support; so in this respect the par-
ent retains a very effective means of control, and in light of the
purpose of the principal statute what appears to be the very type
of control that the legislature had in mind. Though it is probable
that the legislature did not intend the phrase, "living with the par-
ent", to exclude from coverage those parents whose children are
financially dependent upon them and who are but temporarily
absent from their home, the legislature's expressed intent is not so
clear as to preclude the court from holding otherwise.
A situation could arise where the mother has the custody of a
child and the father has the responsibility to support the child. To
place the liability upon the mother, who may be dependent upon
alimony payments by the father as her and her child's sole means
of support, would be a harsh result; but on the other hand, to place
liability upon the father, who has had nothing to do with the train-
ing and discipline of the child, would not seem to be a fair result.
The parent's liability under the principal statute is limited to
those acts of his children which are criminal in nature; i.e., malicious
and wilful acts. The criminal law rules governing capacity of an
infant to commit a criminal act divide infants into three age
groups:15 (1) an infant under seven years of age is conclusively
presumed incapable of committing a crime; (2) an infant between
the age of seven and fourteen years is prima facie incapable of com-
mitting a crime; (3) all persons over the age of fourteen years are
presumed capable of committing a crime.
By application of the criminal law rules of capacity to the
principal statute, would the acts of an infant under the age of seven
come under the statute? Would the injured party be required to
overcome the prima facie presumption of incapacity of an infant
between the age of seven and fourteen years by clear and con-
vincing proof?
15 State ex rel. Cain v. Skeen, 137 W. Va. 808, 74 S.E.2d 413 (1953);
State v. Vineyard, 81 W. Va. 98, 98 S.E. 1034 (1917).
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Though the legislature gives no indication that the capacity of
the infant is to be determined by the criminal law rules, it appears
that the requirement that the act be "wilful and malicious" would
of necessity require the plaintiff to establish that the infant is capa-
ble of performing such an act; and since the legislature provides no
other standard, the court is likely to apply rules that are applicable
to analogous situations.
The injured party may recover from the parent of a minor
under the age of eighteen years. Does this mean that the minor
must be under the age of eighteen when the action is brought, or
does it mean that the minor must have been under the age of eight-
een when he committed the act?
There is no express provision preventing a double recovery by
proceeding against the parent under the principal statute and under
the common law theory of negligence. The limitation to actual
damages, not to exceed three hundred dollars, under the statute
seems to indicate a contrary legislative intent, but the statute pro-
vides that the right of action and remedy granted therein is in addi-
tion to and not exclusive of any existing right of action and remedy
against the parent. In that the stated legislative intent is to provide
the injured party with an additional right of action, the court could
by a strict interpretation prevent any additional recovery than that
specifically provided for by the statute. Since the statutory theory
of liability is based upon either the assumed or provable negligence
of the parent, an election to seek recovery under the statute might
be held res juicata in a second action brought against the parent
under the common law theory of negligence.16
There is no indication that the injured party could not main-
tain an action against the child after having proceeded against the
parent under the principal statute. Unless the parent's negligence
was held to be the sole proximate cause of the injury, the child
would not be relieved of liability for his act. But since the act of
the child must be "wilful" it does not appear that the parent's negli-
gence in rearing his child could be considered as the sole factor
motivating the child to perform the act. So it would seem that
unless the court advances upon the theory that the parent's negli-
16 Cf. Hannah v. Beasley, 132 W. Va. 814, 53 S.E.2d 729 (1949);
Marguerite Coal Co. v. Meadow River Lumber Co., 98 W. Va. 698, 127
S.E. 644 (1925).
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gence "contributes" to the cause of the injury, thus holding the par-
ent and child to be joint tort-feasor, an injured party could recover
from both the parent and the child.
The principal statute, though imposing liability upon the parent
for his child's act, makes no provision entitling the parent to the
corresponding rights the child may possess in relation to the act.
The liability of a joint tort-feasor is several as well as joint,' 7 and
recovery from one joint tort-feasor entitles that tort-feasor to con-
tributionmh from the other tort-feasor. The question of contribution
between the parent and his child may arise if, in light of the pre-
ceding discussion, they are held to be joint tort-feasors. It is more
likely that the question will arise as a result of an action maintained
against the parents of only one of the joint tort-feasors. A holding
by the court that the one parent is entitled to contribution from the
parents of the other joint tort-feasors would produce an equitable
result.
Though it appears, that under the principal statute the parents
of joint tort-feasors may be held severally liable for their children's
torts, the possibility of their being jointly liable appears to be limited
to those cases where the damages do not exceed the three hundred
dollar limitation.
A difficult problem may arise when the tort involves injury
to both the person and his property; since recovery under the prin-
cipal statute is limited to property damage. The law is settled in
this jurisdiction that only a single action may be maintained to
recover for both bodily injury and property damage arising out
of the same tort. 9 An injured party could not maintain an action
against the child to recover for his personal injuries if he had, in
a previous action against the child, recovered for the property
damage arising out of the same tort.20 It is improbable that the
injured party, by maintaining an action against the parent under
the principal statute for the property damage involved, would forfeit
his rights to proceed against the child for his personal injuries when
it later appears that the child is a solvent party.2 '
1 7 Muldoon v. Kepner, 91 S.E.2d 727 (W. Va. 1956); State ex rel. Bum-
garner v. Sims, 139 W. Va. 92, 79 S.E.2d 277 (1958).
18 W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 7, § 18 (Michie 1955).
19 Mills v. DeWees, 93 S.E.2d 484 (W.Va. 1956).
20 See Mills v. DeWees, note 19 supra.
21 Note 16 supra.
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [1958], Art. 6
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol60/iss2/6
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
The principal statute does not require the plaintiff to join the
child as a party defendant in an action against the parent. Since
the child may have sufficient assets to partially satisfy a judgment
rendered against him, may he be joined with his parent in a single
action or must the plaintiff sue the parent under the principal statute
and then proceed against the child in another action? The expense
of maintaining two actions would, in many cases, deprive the plain-
tiff of any benefit he would otherwise have derived from the child's
partial solvency.
A question of the principal statute's constitutionality may arise
under the due process clause22 of the constitution of West Virginia
and it is felt that the many uncertainties presented by the statute
would greatly aid the court in making a finding against the statute's
constitutionality.28
Though the principal statute in its present form may produce
the legislature's intended effect, if by nothing more than making the
parent aware of his parental duties, it is submitted that the statute,
with only slight revision, would produce this same effect and, at
the same time, would eliminate many of the questions that are
raised by the statute in its present form.
J. D. McD.
J. L.R.
22 W. VA. CONST. art. HI, § 10.
23 Cf. State ex rel. Ballard v. Vest, 136 W. Va. 80, 65 S.E.2d 649 (1951);
Newhart v. Pennybacker, 120 W. Va. 774, 200 S.E. 754 (1938).
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